Abstract-We study the problem of wireless network resilience to node failures from a percolation-based perspective. In practical wireless networks, it is often the case that the failure probability of a node depends on its degree (number of neighbors). We model this phenomenon as a degree-dependent site percolation process on random geometric graphs. In particular, we obtain analytical conditions for the existence of phase transitions within this model. Furthermore, in networks carrying traffic load, the failure of one node can result in redistribution of the load onto other nearby nodes. If these nodes fail due to excessive load, then this process can result in a cascading failure. Using a simple but descriptive model, we show that the cascading failure problem for largescale wireless networks is equivalent to a degree-dependent site percolation on random geometric graphs. We obtain analytical conditions for cascades in this model. This work represents the first investigation of cascading phenomena in networks with geometric constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
In large-scale wireless networks, nodes are often vulnerable to attacks, natural hazards, and resource depletion. The ability of wireless networks to maintain global communication in the face of these challenges is a central concern for network designers. For this purpose, a network may be considered to be functional if the size of the largest connected component of operational nodes grows linearly with the size of the network. On the other hand, if the size of the largest operational component vanishes as a fraction of the network as the network size grows, then the network is not considered to be functional. A network may be said to be resilient if the remaining network is functional even after many node and link failures. For instance, if the wireless sensor network still manages to collect information from a constant fraction of the sensors even after a substantial number of node and link failures, then the network is resilient. On the other hand, if after many node and link failures, the sensor network breaks down into isolated parts where even the largest component can reach only a few other nodes, then the network is not considered to be resilient. From this perspective, the characterization of network resilience corresponds to the study of the qualitative and quantitative properties of the largest connected component. A powerful tool for this study stems from the theory of percolation [1], [2] . 1This research is supported in part by National Science Foundation (NSF) Cyber Trust grant CNS-0716335, and by Army Research Office (ARO) grant W911NF-07-1-0524.
A percolation process resides in a random graph structure, where nodes or links are randomly designated as either "occupied" or "unoccupied." When the graph structure resides in continuous space, the resulting model is described by continuum percolation [1], [2] . A major focus of continuum percolation theory is the random geometric graph induced by a Poisson point process with constant density A. A fundamental result for continuum percolation concerns a phase transition effect whereby the macroscopic behavior of the system is very different for densities below and above some critical value A c • For A < A c (subcritical or non-percolated), the connected component containing the origin (or any other fixed point) contains a finite number of points almost surely. For A > A c (supercritical or percolated), the connected component containing the origin (or any other fixed point) contains an infinite number of points with a positive probability [1], [2] .
In this paper, we study the resilience of large-scale wireless networks to node failures from the percolation perspective. In practical wireless networks, it is often the case that the failure probability of a node depends on its degree (number of neighbors). For instance, a wireless sensor node which must communicate with a large number of neighbors is more likely to deplete its energy reserve. A communication node directly connected to many other nodes in a military network is more likely to be attacked by an enemy seeking to break down the whole network. Such phenomenon can be described by a general model where each node fails with a probability depending on its degree. In this paper, we study such degreedependent node failure problems. Specifically, by analyzing the problem as a degree-dependent site percolation process on random geometric graphs, we obtain analytical conditions on percolation in this model.
In networks which carry load, distribute a resource or aggregate data, such as wireless sensor networks and electrical power networks, the failure of one node often results in redistribution of the load from the failed node to other nearby nodes. If nodes fail when the load on them exceeds some maximum capacity or when the battery energy is depleted, then a cascading failure or avalanche may occur because the redistribution of the load causes other nodes to exceed their thresholds and fail, thereby leading to a further redistribution of the load. An example of such a cascading failure is the power outage in the western United States in In practical wireless networks, however, it is often the case that the failure probability of a node depends on its degree. We therefore study network resilience in the face of degreedependent node failures. Let Note that in wireless networks, a node with more neighbors (higher degree k) may suffer from more interference. If we take the failure probability q(k) to be increasing in k, then the effects of interference can be captured by our failure model.
To study the percolation-based connectivity of
we consider a degree-dependent site percolation process for random geometric graphs. Similar problems have been studied in the context of Erdos-Renyi random graphs and random graphs with given degree distributions using generating function methods [6] , [8] - [10] . Due to clustering effects and geometric constraints, however, generating function methods are not applicable for random geometric graphs. The SINR-based percolation model for wireless networks studied in [11] , [12] involve dependent percolation but not degree-dependent percolation. In [13] , a degree-dependent site percolation model is studied. There, the authors propose a topology control mechanism for sensor networks where each sensor stays active for a t fraction of the time, where ¢ is a constant and k > ¢. The authors obtain a sufficient condition for the existence of an infinite component within this model. A more general model is studied in [14] . As in [13] , [14] provides only a sufficient condition for the existence of an infinite component. In this paper, in addition to a sufficient condition, a necessary condition for the existence of an infinite component is found for our model. The main results are as follows.
August 1996, which resulted from the spread of a small initial power shutdown in EI Paso, Texas. The power outage spread through six states as far as Oregon and California, leaving several million customers without electronic power [3] , [4] . Cascades have also been studied in social networks [5] , [6] . In wireless sensor networks constrained by battery resource, the system may suffer similar cascading failure problems, though the cascading process may be much slower than that for power networks. In this paper, we study cascade failures in large-scale wireless networks. To our knowledge, this is the first work to address cascading phenomena in networks with geometric constraints. We show that such problems can be mapped to a percolation process on random geometric graphs. Using our degree-dependent site percolation model, we obtain analytical conditions on the occurrence of a cascading failure.
II. RANDOM GEOMETRIC GRAPHS AND CONTINUUM PERCOLATION
We use random geometric graphs to model wireless networks. That is, we assume that the network nodes are randomly placed over some area, and a communication link exists between two (randomly placed) nodes if the distance between them is sufficiently small, so that the received power is large enough for successful decoding. A mathematical model for this is as follows. Let II . II be the Euclidean norm, and Xj , X 2 , ... be a set of points generated by a homogeneous 
III. RANDOM NODE FAILURES
As we mentioned in the introduction, the problem of network resilience to random node failures can be described by a percolation process on the graph modelling the network.
Suppose the network modelled by G(H A,l) is subject to random node failures where each node fails, along with all associated links, with probability q, independently of other nodes. According to Thinning Theorem [1], [2] , the remaining then with probability 1, there exists an infinite (4) Pr(30 p(3m)) < 4 · 3 3rn -1p7' +1 =~Pl(33pdm . (6) where Co = A(2V2 + 7r), when q(k) is non-increasing in k, then with probability I, there is no infinite connected
).
An interesting implication of Theorem I-(i) is that even if
all nodes with degree larger than k o fail with probability I, an infinite component still exists in the remaining graph as long as (I) is satisfied. Note that although (I) resembles the percolation condition for independent node failures, Theorem I is far from a straightforward generalization of the result for independent failures. is the density function of the point process resulting from the degree-dependent failure model.? then using Strassen's Theorem [15] , we can couple the two point processes to show that the resulting graph is always percolated. Given the general form of q(k), however, computing the density function of the resulting point process is difficult.
To tackle this problem, we use a renormalization argument that employs a mapping between the continuum model and a discrete percolation model. A similar technique was used in [II], [12] . Using the fact that this mapping is one to one, we can bound the density of the point process resulting from the degree-dependent failure model, and then resort to coupling methods. The proof for Theorem I-(i) is the same as the one for Proposition I in [14] . In the following, we give the proof for Theorem I-(ii). (ii) There is a link of G(H).. , 1, q(.)) crossing Sa which directly connects two nodes of G(H).. , 1, q(.)) outside Sa.
Proof of Theorem l-(ii) :
In Figure I, (6) converges to 0 as m ----7 00. This implies that with probability I, there is no infinite path starting from the origin (which is arbitrary) in L. Therefore, with probability 1, there is no infinite component in G(H).. , 1, q(.)) is the circular region centered at x with radius 8. 3Note that the choice of the origin is arbitrary. with A > A c ' where an initial failure seed is represented by a single failed node. This initial failure seed is an exogenous event (shock) that is very small relative to the whole network. We are interested in whether this initial small shock can lead to a global cascade of failures, which is technically defined as follows.
Note that in characterizing cascading failure, the essential point is to assess whether the network has been affected in a global manner, rather than in an isolated local manner. For this reason, cascades cannot be easily characterized by, for instance, what percentage of the network nodes have failed. Instead, after some thought, one is led to the conclusion that percolation (the existence of an infinite failed component) is an appropriate notion with which to characterize cascading failures. Thus, we have the following definition.
To describe cascading failures, we use the following simple but descriptive model. We assume that due to redistribution of the load, each node i fails if a given fraction ' l/Ji of its neighbors have failed, where the 'l/Ji'S are i.i.d. random variables with probability density function f('l/J). The order of the failure sequence is then the topological order determined by the location of the initial failure and the threshold ' l/Ji of each node i.
Unlike the degree-dependent scenarios studied earlier, cascading failure processes exhibit dynamic evolution. This is illustrated in Figure 3 . The simple network in Figure 3 We can also apply Theorem l-(ii) to obtain a lower bound on the critical value of ¢ . By substituting (7) into (2) Fig. 2 . Critical value of <p obtained by condition (9) For any given A, we can use (9) to find the critical value of ¢. 
IV. CASCADING NODE FAILURES
As we pointed out above, in networks which carry load, distribute a resource or aggregate data, such as wireless sensor networks and electrical power networks, the failure of one node often results in the redistribution of the load from the failed node to other nearby nodes. If nodes fail when the load on them exceeds some maximum capacity or when the battery energy is depleted, then a cascading failure or avalanche may occur because the redistribution of the load causes other nodes to exceed their thresholds and fail, thereby leading to a further redistribution of the load.
In contrast to previous work on social and physical infrastructure networks [3] - [6] , we study cascading failures in large-scale wireless networks modelled by random geometric graphs. To our knowledge, this is the first investigation of cascading phenomena in networks with geometric constraints. In particular, we consider the following model. Consider a As an example of degree-dependent failures, one may consider a strategy where an attacker sets a threshold ¢ and destroys all nodes having degree strictly greater than ¢. Given G('H>.,l) and an integer ¢, all nodes with degree strictly greater than ¢ and their associated links fail, and all other nodes remain operational. That is further failures can occur in the network (Figure 3-(f) ). The resulting network is denoted by G (H,\, 1, 1/J For two adjacent nodes u and v, we say that node u's failure is caused by node v's failure if and only if node u's failure immediately follows node v's failure in the ordered failure sequence. In the example of Figure 3 , node c's failure is caused by node !'s failure, and node d's failure is caused by node c's failure. Now observe that the initial failure can grow only when some neighbor, say j, of the initial failure seed has a threshold satisfying 1/Jj ::;~., where kj 2:: 1 is the degree of j. We call such a node v~lnerable. The probability of a node being vulnerable is For k == 0, we set 0"0 == 1. Intuitively, a node i with no neighbors should be reliable, since it remains operational no matter what 1/Ji is, unless node i itself is the initial failure. This also agrees with (11) by applying the convention F( -00) == O.
In the example of Figure 3 , nodes a, hand i are reliable, and all the other nodes are unreliable. Note that when two reliable nodes are adjacent and neither is an initial failure seed, no matter what else happens in the network, they remain operational. This is illustrated by nodes hand i in Figure 3 .
When a reliable node u has only unreliable neighbors, node u fails if and only if all its unreliable neighbors fail, unless node u is the initial failure. We call such a reliable node an isolated reliable node.
The following theorem presents our main results on cascading failures in wireless networks. It provides a sufficient condition for the existence of an infinite component of vulnerable nodes, as well as a sufficient condition for the nonwhere F'ljJ (.) is the cumulative distribution function of 1/Jj. In the example of Figure 3 , nodes c, e and 9 are vulnerable.
When the initial failure seed is directly connected to a component of vulnerable nodes, all nodes in this component fail. The extent of the failure, and hence the resilience of the network, depends not only on the number of vulnerable nodes, but also on how they are connected to one another. In the context of this model, a cascade of failed nodes forms when the network has an infinite component of vulnerable nodes and the initial failure seed is either inside this component or adjacent to some node in this component.
On the other hand, if node i has a threshold satisfying 1/Ji > kk~1, where k, is the degree of i, then node i will not fail as long as at least one neighbor is operational. We call such a node reliable. Otherwise, if 1/Ji ::; kk~1, we call node i unreliable. For k 2:: 1, the probability of a node being reliable is given by Proof" To prove (i), we view the problem as a degreedependent node failure problem where a vulnerable node is considered "operational" and a non-vulnerable node is considered a "failure." In this model, each node with degree k fails with a probability 1 -Pk. Then, by applying Theorem To prove (ii), we first show (a): if (13) holds, then with probability 1, there is no infinite component of unreliable nodes. We then show (b): if there is no infinite component of unreliable nodes, then with probability 1, there is no cascading failure no matter where the initial failure is.
To show (a), we apply the result of Theorem l-(ii). Regard an unreliable node as "operational" and a reliable node as a "failure". Then, O"k-the probability of a node with degree k being reliable-becomes the failure probability q(k) in the context of Theorem l-(ii). Since O"k is non-increasing in k, we replaceq(m+k-1) in(3)withO"m+k-l = 1-F,p (:t~=n and obtain (13) . By Theorem l-(ii), when (13) holds, with then with probability 1, there exists an infinite component of vulnerable nodes in G(H,\, 1) . Moreover, if the random initial failure is inside this component or adjacent to some node in this component, then with probability 1, there is a cascading failure in G (H,\, 1).
where Co == A(2J2 + 1r) and F'ljJ (-00) == 0 by convention, then with probability 1, there is no infinite component of unreliable nodes. As a consequence, with probability 1, there is no cascading failure in G (H,\, 1) no matter where the initial failure is.
(10) Fig. 4 . For any node i , the number of its isolated reliable neighbors cannot be strictly greater than 6. This is because any two nodes j and k inside one of six fan-shaped regions are adjacent to each other. Thus , nodes j and k cannot be isolated reliable by definition. By the same argument, when i is the initial failure, the number of induced isolated reliable nodes cannot be strictly greater than 6.
probability I, there is no infinite component of unreliable nodes in the network. In order to show (b), we will show that if there is a cascading failure, i.e., there is an infinite component W of failed nodes, there must exist an infinite component of unreliable nodes in the network. Assume the initial failure takes place at node u , and consider two cases: (1) node u is an unreliable node or an isolated reliable node; (2) node u is a non-isolated reliable node.
For case (1), if there is an infinite component of failed nodes in the network, all the failed nodes are either unreliable or isolated reliable. This is because non-isolated reliable nodes do not fail no matter what happens in the network. Furthermore, except for the initial failure, an isolated reliable node fails if and only if all its (unreliable) neighbors fail. This implies that except for the initial failure, the failure of any isolated reliable node does not cause any other failures. In other words, the failure of any unreliable node is caused by the failure(s) of other unreliable node(s). Thus, all the unreliable nodes in W belong to the same component. Now suppose there is only a finite number of unreliable nodes in W. Then there must be an infinite number of isolated reliable nodes in W. Note first that an isolated reliable node cannot be adjacent to another isolated reliable node by definition. Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 4 , each unreliable node cannot have strictly more than 6 isolated reliable neighbors. Therefore, it is impossible to have a finite number of unreliable nodes but an infinite number of isolated reliable nodes in W. This contradiction ensures that the component of unreliable nodes in W is infinite.
For case (2), a non-isolated reliable node fails if and only if (i) it is adjacent to the initial failure, (ii) not adjacent to any other reliable nodes, and (iii) all of its unreliable neighbors fail. We call a non-isolated reliable node satisfying condition (i}-(ii) an induced isolated reliable node. As illustrated in Figure 4 , the number of induced isolated reliable nodes cannot be strictly greater than 6. Except for the initial failure and a finite number of induced isolated reliable nodes, all other failed nodes in Ware either isolated reliable or unreliable. Observe that as in the failure of an isolated reliable node, the failure of an induced isolated reliable node does not cause any other failures. In other words, the failure of any unreliable node is caused by the failure(s) of other unreliable node(s). Thus, all the unreliable nodes in W belong to the 6 same component. Then by the same argument for the first case, there must exist an infinite component of unreliable nodes in W . 0
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied network resilience problems from a percolation-based perspective. To analyze realistic situations where the failure probability of a node depends on its degree, we introduced the degree-dependent failures problem. We model this phenomenon as a degree-dependent site percolation process on random geometric graphs. Using coupling methods and renormalization arguments, we obtained analytical conditions for the occurrence of phase transitions within this model. Furthermore, in networks carrying traffic load, such as wireless sensor networks and electrical power networks, the failure of one node can result in redistribution of the load onto other nearby nodes. If these nodes fail due to excessive load, then this process can result in cascading failures. We analyzed this cascading failure problem in largescale wireless networks, and showed that it is equivalent to a degree-dependent percolation process on random geometric graphs. We obtained analytical conditions for the occurrence and non-occurrence of cascading failures, respectively.
